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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS-

1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY

KENNETH L ROBERTS*

I. CoR~oPRTIONS
A. FiduciaryDuties of Officers and Directors
B. Parentand Subsidiary
C. Suit by Unlicensed Foreign Corporation
II. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Partneras Employee Under Workmen's CompensationAct

B. Tax on Sale of Partner'sInterest
I. CORPOITIONS
A. FiduciaryDuties of Officers and Directors
Two opinions of the court of appeals during the survey period
-one unpublished-discussed the fiduciary duties owing by officers
and directors to their corporations.
In Harriman Welding Supply Co. v. Lake City Lightweight Aggregate Corp.,' Presiding Judge McAmis of the eastern section found
occasion to state the principles applicable when the fairness of contracts between two corporations having interlocking directorates is
questioned.
Briefly summarized, the rather involved factual background was
that Coal Creek Mining & Manufacturing Company leased the rights
to shale deposits on its land to one David, who in turn assigned these
rights to Tennessee Lightweight Aggregate Corporation, which was
composed of David, Greenup and Dulworth. David then sold his
interest in Tennessee to the others for $40,000. Thereafter Greenup
and Dulworth formed the Lake City Lightweight Aggregate Corporation and assigned 2 the above lease to it with the expressed purpose
that Lake City was to remove the shale and sell it for use in building
blocks. This assignment provided that in addition to a royalty due
Coal Creek under the original lease, 3 Lake City was also to pay to
Tennessee the difference between that royalty and one dollar per
cubic yard of materials, based on a represented selling price of six
dollars per cubic yard.
At the time of this assignment, Dulworth was president of both
* Associate, Waller, Davis & Lansden, Nashville; Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 330 S.W.2d 564 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
2. The opinion vacillates in designating the transaction both an "assignment" and a "sub-lease."
3. Viz., 73ho per ton of shale mined.
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Tennessee and Lake City and most of the directors of the latter were
also stockholders and directors of Tennessee. Dulworth acted for
Lake City in the matter without obtaining authorization from its
board. Subsequent to the transaction the books of neither corporation reflected any assets or liabilities arising therefrom.
Complainant Harriman brought a general creditor's bill against
Lake City. Upon its being sustained, Tennessee filed an intervening
petition, seeking to recover $117,826.62 allegedly owing from Lake
City as royalties under the above assignment. Lake City defended
against this petition by stating that Tennessee fraudulently represented to it that the product to be made from the shale would bring six
dollars per ton on the market while knowing in fact that it could never
do so because of the high coal content therein; that Tennessee had
promised to excuse the payment of the royalties if they were excessive;
and that inasmuch as the officers and directors of Tennessee were also
in control of Lake City, the transaction should be vitiated. There was
evidence supporting Lake City's contentions and a concurrent finding by master and chancellor resulted in the denial of Tennessee's
claim.4 The decision was affirmed.
The actual holding of the court can rest upon the principle that
there being a reasonable evidentiary basis supporting the concurrent
findings of master and chancellor they are conclusive upon appeal.5
But the court went further:
While the decree might be affirmed on the ground of a concurrent
finding of facts alone, we think, in view of the fact that Dulworth executed the contract as president of both corporations and there was an
interlocking directorate, a court of equity should scrutinize the transaction with care to see that no unfair advantage was obtained by Tennessee over Lake City, its stockholders and creditors.
While such contracts are not void per se, they are to be subjected to
close judicial scrutiny in order to determine the absence or presence of
fraud and unfairness and where a transaction between two corporations
having common directors or officers is challenged by one of them the
burden is upon the other to uphold the transaction by a showing of good
faith and fairness. Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1060.
4. Lake City relied chiefly on the testimony of David, who stated that he
sold his interest in Tennessee prior to the assignment to Lake City because
the proposed creation of and assignment to it of the lease with the additional
royalty provision was but a fraudulent scheme to facilitate the sale of Tennessee stock to the public at exorbitant prices. He further testified that all
directors and officers of Tennessee knew that the shale covered by the lease
could not be used for the purpose of manufacturing building blocks without
additional ingredients and thus was not worth six dollars per ton as represented to Lake City. The probative force of this testimony was not considered destroyed because of the fact that the sale by David to Greenup and
Dulworth put them in a position to promote their scheme.
There was also evidence that Tennessee excused the royalty as being
oppressive.
5. For this, the court cited Black v. Love & Amos Coal Co., 30 Tenn. App.
377, 206 S.W.2d 432 (M.S. 1947).
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In this case, Tennessee made no effort to carry this burden and all
of the evidence in the record shows that the royalty provided by the
sub-lease was grossly excessive and unfair.6
The concern which is exhibited when there are contracts between

corporations having common or interlocking directorates derives from
the equitable principle that an agent cannot fairly serve two principals. There is a danger that the common directors (agents) will be
faced with conflicting duties to the two corporations (principals)
and will be tempted to favor the interests of one while betraying those
of the other.
No less than three different solutions have been advanced by the
courts to resolve this dilemma.7 The older approach is that the common interrelationship alone suffices to render the contract voidable
8
at the option of the corporation complaining, irrespective of fairness.
This impractical position has, fortunately, been seldom followed.
The attitude of a few of the courts has been to treat such contracts as
valid only if those directors having conflicting interests withdraw from
the negotiations leaving a majority or quorum which is not adversely
affected. 9
The majority and federal rule is not so arbitrary as either of the
above. It is that such contracts, though subject to close judicial
scrutiny, are voidable only for unfairness or collusion, but the burden
of showing fairness, good faith and reasonableness rests upon those
seeking to uphold the transaction. There is no automatic setting
aside of the contract-each case turns on its particular equities. 10
Judge McAmis clearly and lucidly aligns the court with the
majority in the instant case. Such a position recognizes the needs of
corporate business, yet adequately protects against fraud and imposition. It acknowledges that corporations are distinct legal entities
with contractual privileges and that the complexities of modern
business relationships among such bodies necessitate considerable
freedom, yet demands that management justify its actions when there
is introduced an element of chicane. It is hoped that this approach
will be perpetuated in Tennessee.'
6. 330 S.W.2d at 568.

7. See generally,

BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS

§ 72 (rev. ed. 1946).

8. See, e.g., O'Connor Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., 95 Ala. 614,
10 So. 290 (1891).
9. See, e.g., Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419 (1881).
10. This is often called the "Geddes Rule" after Geddes v. Anaconda Copper

Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921). See also Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson,
251 U.S. 68 (1919); United Towing Co. v. Phillips, 242 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1957);
Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1949); Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1933), cert. denied
290 U.S. 675 (1933).
11. Although Judge McAmis cites only the A.L.R. annotation for authority,
see Thatch v. Brown Knitting Co., 23 Tenn. App. 317, 132 S.W.2d 228 (E.S.
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Although faced with a somewhat different situation, a distinctly
contrary rationale formed the basis of Judge Hickerson's opinion in
Gillespie v. Branham.2
In that case, Nashville Dental, Inc., purchased land upon which to
erect a building for its business. Subsequently at a meeting unattended
by Mrs. Branham, its president and owner of sixty-two per cent of
the voting stock, the board voted to sell the tract to her at its original
cost. The consideration given therefor was an unsecured, non-interest
bearing, five-year note and the promise to construct the necessary
building out of individual funds and to lease it back to the corporation. After incurring considerable expense in construction, Mrs. Branham became short of funds. The corporation then agreed (again, at a
meeting at which she was not present) to advance her sufficient funds
to complete the building, and did so. She agreed to return the sum
advanced on or before June 1, 1957, at five per cent interest.
Plaintiffs were minority stockholders who sought to have the
transfer to Mrs. Branham set aside in equity. Their theory was that
since Mrs. Branham was the president and controlling stockholder
and "dominated" the board, the transfer was but one from herself as
seller to herself as purclhaser, and that being in such a position her
duty was that of an express trustee and that the transfer was absolutely void, irrespective of any showing of fairness or benefit to the
corporation.
The defense was that the transaction was for the best interests of
the corporation, and this apparently had merit as the chancellor
dismissed the bill.
However, the decision was reversed and remanded. The court of
appeals adopted the plaintiff's position in toto. It stated that Mrs.
Branham
had complete control of the board of directors and the officers of the
corporation; and they did exactly what she told them to do. Thus, Mrs.
Branham, representing the corporation, directed the corporation to trans13
fer its property to Mrs. Branham, the individual.
The court then quoted from the old case of Tisdale v. Tisdale, to wit:
The right to sell and to buy cannot exist in the same person, because
of the antagonistic interest in the two positions. Hence the fairness or
unfairness of the transaction, and the comparison of price and value, or
the existence or absence of actual fraud, are not permitted to enter into
the consideration of the court. It is enough that the relation of trustee,
and cestui que trust, existed. This appearing, the investigation is at an
1939). However, cf. Atalla Iron Ore Co. v. Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co., 111
Tenn. 527, 77 S.W. 774 (1903).
12. 337 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
13. Id. at 690.
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end, and the doctrine applies with all its force.14
It then summed up by saying:
Mrs. Branham was acting as President and the completely dominant force
in the corporation and at the same time she was acting for herself
personally in the sale by the corporation to her personally of valuable
corporate properties. Whether the sale benefited the corporation does
not enter into the consideration of the Court. Mrs. Branham could not
legally act for the corporation and for herself at the same time because
of the antagonistic interest of the two positions.15
With all deference to the court, the opinion is subject to criticism.
In the first place, Tisdale and other cases cited by the court, while
analogous are not exactly in point. In context, the broad statement in
TisdaZe had application to a situation where one co-tenant in land
sought to buy-in an encumbered title for his individual benefit. It was
held that he would be presumed to act for all, although the others
would be required to contribute their pro rata share of the encumbrance. The case did not deal with the fiduciary duties of corporate
16
management.
Further, although officers and directors are subject to the highest
standards of loyalty and good faith and their position is often
analogized to that of a trustee, guardian or executor, it is not generally
held that they are in fact express trustees or subject to the same
strict disabilities of the latter. 7 In fact, one of the most famous
statements in this area is that of Judge Lurton (later Mr. Justice
Lurton of the United States Supreme Court) in the Tennessee case
of Wallace v. Lincoln Savings Bank.18
Directors are not express trustees. The language of Special Judge
Ingersol in Shea v. Mabry, 1 Lea, 319, that "directors are trustees," etc.
is rhetorically sound, but technically inexact. It is a statement often
found in opinions, but is true only to a limited extent. They are
mandatories; they are agents; they are trustees in the sense that every
14. Id. at 691. The Tisdale case appears in 34 Tenn. 596, 608 (1855).
15. Id. at 692.
16. Other cases relied on by the court were Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208
S.W.2d 344 (1948); Central Bus Lines v. Hamilton Natl Bank, 34 Tenn. App.
480, 239 S.W.2d 583 (E.S. 1951). Meinhard was concerned with the situation
of an individual coadventurer secretly appropriating unto himself an opportunity related to the joint enterprise without disclosure to the other coadventurer, thus depriving the latter of his right to compete. Although the
Dale and the Central Bus Line cases were concerned with fiduciary duties
of officers and directors, neither is as broad as the court's position in the instant case. In fact, the latter states, at 34 Tenn. App. 486, that "the existence
of a fiduciary relationship does not in itself give rise to a constructive trust."
17. See 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 838 (1947); BALLENTINE,
CORPORATIONS §§ 66-71 (rev. ed. 1946); 13 Am. JuR. Corporations § 997 (1938).
Cf. Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 27 Del. Ch. 381, 38 A.2d 808, 820 (1944).
18. 89 Tenn. 630, 649, 15 S.W. 448, 453 (1891). Accord, Uffelman v.
Boillin, 19 Tenn. App. 1, 82 S.W.2d 545 (M.S. 1935).
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agent is a trustee for his principal, and bound to exercise diligence and
good faith ....
At most, they are implied trustees....
Even under the stricter English approach (which places directors
or officers under strict disqualifications from dealing with the corporation irrespective of fairness) such contracts are not deemed void,
but only voidable at the election of the corporation within a reasonable
time.19
The great weight of American authority is that such contracts are
not void per se. 20 Moreover, they are not even voidable if approved
by a disinterested quorum or voting majority and if the defendant
directors or officers show them to be fair.21 Even in those situations
where the director's presence is necessary to constitute a quorum, the
contract is generally held only voidable at the option of the corporation. 22
It is submitted that the rationale of the Harriman case above, relating to interlocking directorates, is equally applicable here and sets
forth a reasonable approach-i.e., that the effectiveness of such contracts should turn upon the elements of fairness presented in each
case, with the burden of proving fairness being upon the officers
23
and directors when challenged.
B. Parent and Subsidiary
The formation by one corporation of subsidiary corporations is
common; the underlying motives may vary. Sometimes the purpose
is the avoidance of an otherwise applicable rule, statute or precedent; at other times the predicate is the business-like operation of
the corporate affairs. Irrespective of motive, the legal issue often
presented-in diverse factual situations-is whether the separate
19. See 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 930 (1947).
20. See Rawlings v. New Memphis Gaslight Co., 105 Tenn. 268, 60 S.W.
206 (1900); 13 Amv. JuR. Corporations§ 1005 (1938).
21. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Fowle Memorial Hosp. Co. v.
Nicholson, 189 N.C. 44, 126 S.E. 94 (1925); 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 931 (1947). However, the dominating influence of one individual
might be held to negate the effect of an otherwise disinterested quorum or
majority. See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121
N.E. 378 (1918).
22. 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 932-40 (1947).
23. Adopting this approach are e.g., Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754
(6th Cir. 1949); Ransome Concrete Mach. Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (2d Cir.
1922); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn. 277, 156
N.W. 255 (1916). It might also be noted that even if the contract be deemed
voidable, most courts say that the contract may nevertheless be ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by a majority of the shareholders within a reasonable
time. United Hotels Co. of America v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1945);
Cullen v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 S.W. 693 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897).
And, several cases would allow the shareholder with the adverse interest to
also vote for the ratification. 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 982984 (1947).
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entity characteristic of both parent and subsidiary should not be
disregarded and both treated as one.
Frequently the point urged is that the subsidiary has been so controlled and dominated by the parent as to make the latter in some
wise responsible for obligations that would otherwise fall upon the
subsidiary. When parental liability is imposed in response to such
urgings, the shorthand phrases most often used to explain the reason
therefor are that the subsidiary is but the "adjunct," "instrumentality" or "agent" of the parent, or is merely its "alter ego." The use of
such phrases has been criticised as beclouding the true issues involved
and serving only as readily available substitutes for analysis.2
This issue was raised in the recent federal case of Garrett v.
Southern Ry.2 It received an admirably painstaking and thorough
treatment at the hands of Judge Taylor of the Eastern District.
There, plaintiff, a wheel moulder in the Lenoir Car Works at Lenoir
City, Tennessee, contracted silicosis from silica dust in the foundry.
Lenoir was the subsidiary of the Southern Railway Company. Plaintiff sought to recover benefits under the Federal Employees Liability
Act from Southern on the theory that Lenoir was but an "instrumentality" of Southern and therefore the latter was plaintiff's true
corporate employer. The factors relied upon by plaintiff to support
his position were that: Southern owned all the capital stock of Lenoir
except the five qualifying shares; all directors and officers of Lenoir
were Southern employees and lived in Washington, D. C. (Southern's
general office); all profits from Lenoir went to Southern; between
1942 and 1957, Lenoir sold to Southern and its affiliates over thirty
million dollars worth of its products (wheels, steel and brass castings) while sales to others amounted only to four and one-half million
dollars; the general accounting for Lenoir was performed by Southern
personnel in Washington; the accident claims of Lenoir employees
were handled by Southern's claims office and all litigation involving
Lenoir was handled by Southern attorneys; the Federal Railroad
Retirement Board had ruled that Lenoir employees were entitled to
benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act because of the relationship between Southern and Lenoir.
Defendant Southern countered with the following propositions in
support of its position that Lenoir's status as a separate and independent corporation should be honored and that plaintiff was therefore obliged to seek recovery under the Tennessee Workmen's
Compensation Act as an employee of Lenoir: that Southern had purchased substantial amounts of goods from firms other than Lenoir and
24. See generally on this subject, BALLENTINE,

(rev. ed. 1946).
25. 173 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).

CORPORATIONS
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while Lenoir had sold the majority of its products to Southern, it had
sold twelve per cent to others, and the purchases by Southern had
been on the basis of fair competitive bidding involving no collusion;
that Lenoir conducted a separate business, with separate offices in
Tennessee, and, although Lenoir's general accounting was performed
by Southern, its local accounting was handled by Lenoir employees;
that the Lenoir operation was highly technical and was supervised
by an independent manager paid by Lenoir and who had no connection with Southern save his voting Southern's proxy at the annual
Lenoir stockholders' meetings; that no individual had ever served
at the same time as a director of both Lenoir and Southern; that
Lenoir maintained a separate bank account and preserved the separate
identity of its funds; that separate tax payments were made; that
Lenoir entered separate collective bargaining agreements and there
was no interchange of seniority between employees of the two
corporations; that Lenoir had its own legal counsel in addition to
the Southern legal staff; that Lenoir owned no track or rolling stock,
published no tariffs, filed no reports with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, used no facilities or property jointly with Southern and
in nowise was connected with the transportation business; that Lenoir
had qualified under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Law.
Upon these facts, Judge Taylor held that there were two separate
and distinct corporate operations and dismissed the complaint. He
ruled that mere ownership of the controlling stock interest by Southern was not enough in itself to invoke the "instrumentality rule"such ownership creates mere "potential control" by the parent. Rather,
it must be found that the subsidiary is but a sham or was formed
for the furtherance of fraud or wrongdoing, or was so completely
dominated and controlled by the parent as to infringe upon the
subsidiary's rights or those of third persons dealing with it for the
benefit of the parent.26 The judge relied upon a statement in the
Sixth Circuit case of Kentucky Electric Power Co. v. Norton Coal
Mining Co. 27 to the effect that:
[Ml ere ownership of all the stock of one corporation by another, and the
26. In so ruling, Judge Taylor seems in accord with the weight of authority.
See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Shields, 220 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1955); Kentucky Elec. Power Co. v. Norton Coal Mining Co., 93 F.2d 923 (6th Cir. 1938);
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 96 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1938), rev'd, 306
U.S. 307 (1939) (not on the principles of law cited but their application to
the facts); Costan v. Manila Elec. Co., 24 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1928); New York
Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (6th Cir. 1918); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California., 155 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Sheridan v. PanAm. Refining Corp., 123 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Berkey v. Third Ave.
Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926); Annot., 50 A.L.R. 611 (1927); 13 Am.

JuR. Corporations §§ 1381-1384 (1938); 13
§ 6222 (1943).
27. 93 F.2d 923, 926 (6th Cir. 1938).

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS
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identity of officers of one with officers of another, are not alone sufficient
to create identity of corporate interest between the two companies or
to create the relation of principal and agent or to create a representative
or fiduciary relationship between the two. If such stock ownership and
potential control be resorted to only for the purpose of normally participating in the affairs of the subsidiary corporation in a manner usual
to stockholders and not for the purpose of taking some unfair advantage
of the subsidiary or using it as a mere adjunct to the main corporation
or as a subterfuge to justify wrongdoing, their identity as separate
corporations will not be disregarded ....
In the instant case Judge Taylor found no evidence that Southern
exercised such domination or control over Lenoir as to render it but
an instrumentality. Lenoir's manager had generally free rein over the
conduct of the business, including major policy decisions, and conducted it as a separate and distinct business. Since both corporations
bought and sold from others, it could be said that Lenoir was not run
solely for the benefit of Southern. Further, most of the indicia
generally relied upon in support of the "instrumentality rule" were
not present, e.g., there were no common directors and officers; the
parent did not finance the subsidiary; the subsidiary was adequately
capitalized; each corporation paid its own salaries and funded its
own losses; Southern did not treat Lenoir's financial responsibility as
its own; the parent did not use the property of the subsidiary as its
own; the directors of Lenoir did not act under orders from Southern
and there was no direct intervention by Southern in the management
28
of Lenoir.
Judge Taylor's approach seems correct. In the absence of facts
clearly showing actual domination and control by the parent operating to the prejudice of the subsidiary or third persons there appears
no compelling reason why a court should arbitrarily ignore the separate entity characteristic of the two corporations upon the mere
finding of potential control through stock ownership. Certainly,
use of the catch phrase "instrumentality" without further explanation
serves only to mislead rather than explain. The parent-subsidiary relationship in the instant case appeared motivated by justifiable business reasons. There appeared to be no prejudicial domination, fraud
or wrongdoing by the parent. It can hardly be said that plaintiff is
unfairly deprived of his just compensation by the decision; rather,
he is but directed to collect it under the Tennessee act rather than
the federal act with which his employer had, at best, merely a re28. The instant case, at pages 919-20 quotes extensively from Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 96 F.2d 693, 704 (10th Cir. 1938) which in turn
quotes from POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS which sets forth

the various factors to be considered in determining whether the "instrumentality doctrine" should be invoked. See also BALLENTINE, CoRP'oRATIONS §
136 (rev. ed. 1946).
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mote connection.2 9
There have been numerous Tennessee cases concerning the "instrumentality rule" or otherwise dealing with the disregard of the
corporate entity. 30 Only a few have been as precise as the present

case. A careful reading of Judge Taylor's full opinion is recommended
to those practitioners facing a similar situation in the future.
C. Suit by Unlicensed Foreign Corporation
The Tennessee Code admits a foreign corporation to do business
in Tennessee upon the meeting of certain requirements, chiefly the
filing of its charter and appointment of an agent for service of
process. 3 ' A monetary penalty is imposed upon those corporations
which engage in business herein without qualifying. 32 Additionally,
it has been judicially determined that corporations which are required to comply with these statutes and fail to do so may not sue
or be sued in the Tennessee courts. 33 However, the requirements and

penalties, both legislative and judicial, are deemed applicable only
34
to those foreign corporations doing intrastatebusiness in Tennessee.
On several occasions, the Tennessee appellate courts have ruled
that where the activities of the foreign corporation consist only in
lending money by the acceptance of applications and notes of Ten29. Lenoir's operation here seems at best incidental to Southern's operation
as a common carrier in interstate commerce. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo,
351 U.S. 493 (1956) (where the railroad itself operated a wheel foundry);
Davis v. Alexander, 269 U.S. 114 (1925) (where one railroad company controlled another railroad company); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis
Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918) (where two railroad companies
owned and controlled a third railroadcompany).
30. American Indemn. Co. v. Southern Missionary College, 195 Tenn. 513,
519, 260 S.W.2d 269 (1952); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Faris, 166 Tenn. 238,
60 S.W.2d 425 (1932); Dillard & Coffin Co. v. Richmond Cotton Oil Co., 140
Tenn. 290, 204 S.W. 758 (1918); Madison Trust Co. v. Stahlman, 134 Tenn. 402,
183 S.W. 1012 (1915); Baldwin v. Davidson, 37 Tenn. App. 606, 267 S.W.2d 756
(M.S. 1954); E. 0. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 33 Tenn.
App. 439, 232 S.W.2d 309 (W.S. 1949); Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Home Ice
& Coal Co., 25 Tenn. App. 316, 156 S.W.2d 454 (M.S. 1941); Commercial Club
v. Epperson, 15 Tenn. App. 649 (M.S. 1932); Acuff v. J. Albert Robbins Co.,
1 Tenn. App. 708, 712-13 (E.S. 1926).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-901 to -907 (1955).
32. At least $100 but not more than $500 per violation, with each day of
unlicensed activity constituting a separate violation. TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-908 (1955).
33. E.g., Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Arnold, 151 Tenn. 540, 269 S.W. 706
(1924); National Plastic Relief Co. v. Signal Amusement Co., 151 Tenn. 235,
269 S.W. 40 (1924); Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 128 Tenn. 417, 161
S.W. 488 (1913); Cary-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 92 Tenn. 587, 22
S.W. 743 (1893).
34. If the business activities are not deemed to be carried on in Tennessee,
the foreign corporation is not subject to the restrictions. Seagram Distillers
Co. v. Corenswet, 198 Tenn. 644, 28 S.W.2d 657 (1955); Phillips v. Johns Mansville Sales Corp., 183 Tenn. 266, 191 S.W.2d 554 (1946). It is settled that
foreign corporations could not be precluded or hampered from doing interstate business herein. Milan Milling Co. v. Gorten, 93 Tenn. 590, 27 S.W. 971
(1894).

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

1009

nessee residents at its home office in another state, such loans do not
constitute Tennessee contracts and, if the corporation carries on no
other business activity in Tennessee, it is not doing an intrastate
business within the meaning of the above provisions. 35 Thus, it could
sue or be sued in Tennessee without qualifying.
The question was raised again in Shoenterprise Corporation v.
Butler,36 where the foreign lending corporation sued on such a note.
The Middle Section of the Court of Appeals, per Felts, J., held that
the defendant not having carried the burden of proving that the
corporation was carrying on an intrastate business in violation of
the statutes when it conducted only activities such as described above,
the prior precedents were controlling and the suit could be maintained.
II. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Partneras Employee Under Workmen's CompensationAct
In Tidwell v. Walden,37 the trial judge found that a mutual association of individuals who permitted their equipment to be jointly
used in coal mining, shared profits on the basis of work output, had
mutual rights of hiring employees, and allowed others to become
associates after due consultation among all, constituted a partnership.
He also found as a fact that plaintiffs' decedent who had been
employed by the partnership as a coal miner subsequently became
a member of the partnership.
The facts being such, the issue presented was whether the decedent's representatives could recover workmen's compensation
benefits 38 from the partnership for his accidental death occurring
subsequent to his becoming a partner. The trial judge cited Gebers
v. Murfreesboro Laundry Co. 39 and held no. His decision was affirmed
by the supreme court in an opinion by former Chief Justice Neil.40
Workmen's compensation acts were passed to protect injured "employees." Although their coverage is generally broadly contrued,
the interesting question has frequently arisen as to whether "partners" are encompassed within the term "employees." Although there
35. Neal v. New Orleans Ass'n, 100 Tenn. 607, 46 S.W. 755 (1898); Deposit

Bank v. Cherry, 20 Tenn. App. 305, 98 S.W.2d 521 (M.S. 1936); Erwin Nat'l
Bank v. Riddle, 18 Tenn. App. 561, 79 S.W.2d 1032 (E.S. 1934); Holston Nat'l
Bank v. American Christian Missionary Soc'y, 11 Tenn. App. 72 (E.S. 1929);
Norton v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 46 S.W. 544 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898).
36. 329 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
37. 330 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1959).
38. Under TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-901 to -1028 (1955).
39. 159 Tenn. 51, 15 S.W.2d 737 (1928).
40. "Regrettable as it may be that the dependents of the deceased workman
are denied the benefit of his support as provided by our Workmen's Compensation Act, we feel that the evidence supports the finding by the trial court."
330 S.W.2d at 319.
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is a conflict in the opinions, 41 the majority viewpoint is that absent a
specific statutory provision otherwise,42 one in fact a partner cannot

also be an employee within the acts. This has been held even though
the very purpose of forming the partnership was to evade the appli43
cation of the act.
The theory underlying the majority approach is that under the
orthodox "aggregate" theory of partnership (i.e., that a partnership
is but an aggregate of individuals rather than a separate legal entity)
each intdividual partner is a principal, ergo an "employer," and thus
cannot also be at the same time an "employee." Tennessee embraced
this viewpoint in the Gebers case. Tidwell merely reaffirms that
position."
To those who would condemn such a result as sacrificing fairness
upon an altar of logic, it is suggested that they direct their efforts at a
legislative redefinition of the term "employee" rather than espousing
a judicial distortion of precedents relating to the law of partnership.
B. Tax on Sale of Partner'sInterest
The opinion of Judge Miller of the Sixth Federal Circuit in Berry
v. United States45 is exceedingly delightful to those consultants whose
greatest joy is devising some mode whereby business may be transacted with the least amount of federal income tax liability.
In March, 1952, Berry and other individuals formed a partnership
with the Mississippi Valley Engineering and Construction Co. for
the purpose of bidding on and performing river channelling and construction under contracts with the United States Engineers. Berry
and the other individuals contributed all the capital; Mississippi contributed no capital but was to supervise and perform all work. The
partnership agreement provided that all partnership contracts were
to be undertaken on a "completed contract" basis with no distribution
of profits until completion and ascertainment of all liabilities and
profit or loss on each project.
A contract was granted and work commenced in April 1952. In
February 1953, when the contract was three fourths completed, Berry
and the other individuals sold their interest in the partnership to
Mississippi for a return of their capital contributions, plus $75,000.
41. Compare Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n, 86 Okla. 139, 207

Pac. 314 (1922)

(partner can be an employee), with People v. Kaplan, 160

Misc. 179, 228 N.Y. Supp. 474 (1936) (partner cannot be an employee).

42. Such as is found in CAL. LAB. CODE ANN., § 3359 (Deering 1953).
43. Wallins Creek Lumber Co. v. Blanton, 288 Ky. 649, 15 S.W.2d 465
(1929); People v. Kaplan, 160 Misc. 179, 288 N.Y. Supp. 474 (1936); Berger
v. Fid. Union Cas. Co., 293 S.W. 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
44. See also Alsup v. Murfreesboro Bread & Ice Cream Co., 165 Tenn. 591,
56 S.W.2d 746 (1932).
45. 267 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1959).
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Berry and his wife reported his share of the $75,000 as long-term
capital gain in their 1953 federal income tax return. Upon completion
of the contract, Mississippi reported the entire profit from the contract as ordinary income to itself.
In 1956 the Commissioner assessed a deficiency against Berry, alleging that his share of the $75,000 was taxable as ordinary income rather
than long-term capital gain. Authority relied upon by the Commissioner was threefold: (1) numerous decisions from other circuits to
the effect that while a partnership interest is itself a capital asset,
items accruing from such interest which would otherwise be taxable
as ordinary income must be segregated upon a sale and taxed at
ordinary income rates; 46 (2) the Helvering v. Horst47 line of cases
holding that where one assigns his right to receive future income
from retained assets the subsequent receipt is taxable to the assignor
as ordinary income; (3) the sixth circuit case of Fisher v. Commissioner,48 which held that the sale of notes in default as to both principal and interest was taxable as ordinary income to the extent of the
defaulted items as this represented a realization of such items which
would otherwise be taxable as ordinary income. Upon these principles, the Commissioner received a judgment from Judge Boyd in the
Western District of Tennessee.
However, on appeal, the decision was reversed and remanded. The
appellate court made short work of the Commissioner's position.
Judge Miller proceeded from the accepted rule that the sale of a
partnership interest (as opposed to individual partnership assets)
is the sale of a capital asset.49 He added, significantly, that although
the potential profit to be derived from a partnership contract is an
element of the value of the partnership interest, this in nowise alters
the nature of the partnership interest itself as a capital asset. As for
the Commissioner's authorities, the judge simply stated that they
were not in point. The Horst line of cases did not involve the sale of
a partnership interest but rather the anticipatory assignment of income from assets retained by the assignor. Likewise, Fisher was not
concerned with the sale of a partnership interest, and further the
income charged to the seller there was accrued at the time of sale.
In the Commissioner's other cases, the sales price represented earned
income at the time of sale; here, there could be no earned income
till the completion of the contract, and the right to future profits
46. Tunnell v. United States, 259 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1958); Leff v. Com-

missioner, 235 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1956); Hulbert v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 399

(7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Snow, 223 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
47. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). See also Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
48. 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 347 U.S. 1014 (1954).
49. See generally, 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON §§ 35.55, .56 (1957).

denied 350 U.S. 831 (1955); Doyle v. Cimmissioner, 102 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1939).
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was too speculative to be computed.
This decision offers outstanding possibilities for the use of a
"collapsible partnership" as a means of tax avoidance if it represents
good law under the present Code. But therein lies the trouble. Although mentioned nowhere in the opinion, the transactions in the
instant case must obviously have been subject to the 1939 Code, since
they were completed before 1954. That Code had no specific provision
governing the precise question raised here and thus the courts were
and are free to develop their own principles thereunder.
However, the 1954 Code has set forth some very detailed principles
governing such situations. Section 741 (a)50 now provides that the
sale of a partnership interest is the sale of a capital asset entitled to
capital gains treatment except as otherwise provided in section 751
(a).51 The latter section adds that those items which represent "unrealized receivables" of the partnership or inventory items which
have substantially appreciated in value are not capital assets. What
are "unrealized receivables"? Section 751 (c) 52 states that these are
rights to payment for services rendered or to be rendered. And the
pertinent regulations 53 explain this by stating that the right to payment for services rendered or to be rendered includes rights arising
under contracts or agreements in existence at the time of the sale
although the partnership may not be able to enforce payment until
a later time. Literally construed this would seem to include completed contract arrangements such as in the present case.
One possible "out" remains. In view of the positive forcefulness of
Judge Miller's opinion (and the fact that the 1939 Code is not mentioned) there is a slight possibility that the rationale of this decision
was intended, and would be held, to be applicable to transactions arising under the 1954 Code, in spite of the wording of the above provisions. Consultants who would deign to risk this and adapt other
transactions to fit within the rule of this case should bear in mind
however that it seems to set forth two equal prerequisites for its
rationale to apply: (1) The item or interest sold must be a capital
asset; (2) if there be any income element therein, it must represent
that which has not yet been earned or accrued.
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 741 (a).

51. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 751 (a).
52. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 751 (c).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(c) (1) (ii) (1954).

